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ABSTRACT 
Americans increasingly turn to the computer instead of 
the television to gain access to their favorite shows. With 
this in mind, Aereo allows its subscribers to stream 
broadcast television content to their computers, but does 
not compensate the broadcasters for these retransmissions. 
The broadcasters argue this violates their public 
performance right under the Copyright Act’s Transmit 
Clause, but because of Aereo’s curious technology 
platform, in which thousands of tiny antennas are each 
assigned to a unique subscriber, infringement is uncertain. 
The Supreme Court will soon hear American Broadcasting 
Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., arising out of the Second 
Circuit, and decide whether Aereo’s retransmissions on the 
Internet constitute public performances. This Article argues 
that Aereo is infringing the broadcasters’ public 
performance right and that by expanding on the earlier 
decision Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, 
Inc., the Second Circuit misinterpreted the text and the 
spirit of the Copyright Act. 
* Sam Méndez, University of Washington, Class of 2014. Special thanks to
Professor Robert Gomulkiewicz of the University of Washington School of Law 
for his crucial support, and to Evan Brown, Caitlin Forsyth, Maxwell Burke, 
Nicholas Ulrich, and Eric Siebert for their helpful edits and suggestions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In early 2012, a new technology company called Aereo 
sprouted in New York City amid much controversy.1 Its content 
distribution model was novel. For a monthly membership fee, 
Aereo subscribers are assigned one of thousands of tiny antennae 
that can receive broadcast television airwaves.2 Via these antennae, 
Aereo streams television content to subscribers over the Internet.3 
Aereo also allows subscribers to copy these streams for later 
viewing with the use of remote hard drives. Aereo does not have 
any authorization from broadcast television providers to do so, and 
it does not provide any compensation to broadcasters for these 
transmissions. As a result, many major broadcasters brought suit, 
arguing that Aereo was liable for infringing their rights to public 
1  Brian Stelter, Broadcasters Circle Wagons Against a TV Streaming 
Upstart, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/10/ 
business/media/aereo-has-tv-networks-circling-the-wagons.html. 
2 Frequently Asked Questions, AEREO, https://aereo.com/faqs (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2014). 
3 Id. 
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performance and retransmission.4 In April 2013, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in WNET, Thirteen v. 
Aereo, Inc. (Aereo) affirmed the district court’s denial of the 
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction5 and subsequently 
denied en banc review.6 In the wake of that denial Aereo has 
rapidly expanded beyond New York City.7 The Aereo court’s 
reasoning indicated that had it not been for an earlier Second 
Circuit decision, Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, 
Inc. (“Cablevision”),8 Aereo would have been liable.9  
Aereo convinced the Second Circuit that because it was 
assigning a unique antenna to each subscriber and transmitting the 
broadcast directly to that subscriber’s home, no public 
performance occurred for purposes of the exclusive rights granted 
under the Copyright Act.10 The plaintiffs appealed the case to the 
United States Supreme Court, which recently granted certiorari.11 
The Court’s eventual decision has the potential to change our 
conception of what it means to publicly perform. Specifically, the 
Court must address what constitutes an online public performance. 
4 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013) cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 896, 187 L. Ed. 2d 702 (2014). 
5 Id. at 696 (“Moreover, we find no abuse of discretion in the district 
court’s determination that the balance of hardships does not tip decidedly in the 
Plaintiffs’ favor. The district court reached this decision based on its conclusions 
(1) that the Plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an 
injunction and (2) that Aereo would suffer significant hardship if an injunction 
should issue, since this would likely be the end of its business.”).  
6 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 500 (2d Cir. 2013). 
7 Where Can I Get Aereo?, AEREO, https://aereo.com/coverage (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2014). 
8 Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 
F.3d 121 (2d. Cir. 2008). 
9 Aereo, 712 F.3d at 695 (“Though presented as efforts to distinguish 
Cablevision, many of Plaintiffs’ arguments really urge us to overrule 
Cablevision. One panel of this Court, however, ‘ . . . cannot overrule a prior 
decision of another panel.’ . . . Plaintiffs have provided us with no adequate 
basis to distinguish Cablevision from the Aereo system. We therefore see no 
error in the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail on 
the merits.”) (citing Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees, AFL-
CIO, CLC v. U.S. I.N.S., 336 F.3d 200, 220 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
10 Id. at 694. 
11 Id. at 676. 
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The issue has gained prominence as Aereo and similar 
companies have expanded across the country. Aereo faced other 
suits over its expansion into Salt Lake City, where it lost,12 and 
Boston, where it won.13 Another company with a business model 
and technology nearly identical to Aereo’s was found to be 
infringing by a California district court in late 2012.14 This 
company lost in the District of Columbia as well.15 The judicial 
fortunes of these companies have diverged, but the upcoming 
Supreme Court decision will hopefully provide much-needed 
guidance. 
We live in a time of unprecedented technological development, 
enjoying convenient access to copyrighted work that our 
forefathers could hardly have dreamed of. When Congress enacted 
the current Copyright Act, most Americans consumed television 
content that was broadcast by the major networks. The Internet 
changed that. Today the Internet is ubiquitous and people can 
easily stream and download copyrighted content at their 
convenience, with or without the permission of the copyright 
holders. This threatens the traditional business models of aging 
corporations like the major broadcasters. 
Can the statutory definition of public performance in the 
Copyright Act provide guidance in today’s technological 
landscape, or does the law need to be revised? This Article will 
examine how the Second Circuit treated these issues in 
Cablevision and Aereo and how it answered the central question of 
whether the services sold by the defendants in both cases infringed 
the public performance copyrights of broadcasters. The Second 
Circuit’s ruling in Cablevision set the stage for a ruling in Aereo 
against the broadcasters. This Article will argue because the court 
12 Community Television of Utah v. Aereo, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00910-DN, at 
1 (D. Utah, Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.scribd.com/doc/208029378/aereoutah 
13 Hearst Stations Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-11649, 2013 WL 5604284 (D. 
Mass. Oct. 8, 2013) (denying request for a preliminary injunction against Aereo 
and largely adopting the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Aereo). 
14 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. 
Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2012).  
15 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X, LLC, No. 13-758 (RMC), 
Case 1:13-cv-00758-RMC, at *1 (D. D.C. Sept. 5, 2013), 
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0758-33. 
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relied on an outdated common-law doctrine and a misreading of 
the Copyright Act, both Aereo and Cablevision were decided 
incorrectly. Aereo’s business of retransmitting copyrighted 
material to its subscribers violates the public performance right of 
broadcasting companies, and that the consequences of the Aereo 
decision may be further-reaching than the court intended.  
This Article will proceed by analyzing Cablevision and earlier 
precedent in detail. It will then turn to Aereo and the expansion of 
Cablevision’s interpretation of the public performance right, 
followed by district courts’ subsequent analyses of the issue in the 
Ninth and D.C. circuits. Ultimately, this Article will set the stage 
for the forthcoming Supreme Court review and attempt to forecast 
what is in store for broadcast television and the public performance 
right in a rapidly evolving technological landscape. 
 
I. UNDERSTANDING STREAMING 
 
Background on the definition of Internet “streaming” may help 
contextualize these cases. The Copyright Act does not define 
“streaming,” but Webster’s Dictionary defines it as “relating to or 
being the transfer of data (as audio or video material) in a 
continuous stream especially for immediate processing or 
playback.”16 For example, when a computer user streams a 
television show for immediate playback on his computer, there is a 
continuous transfer of data between that user’s computer and the 
video or song host. Once the streaming has finished, the data are 
no longer on the streamer’s computer. Streaming must be 
distinguished from downloading, which allows the data to be 
stored on the computer for later access. 
Internet connections can be prone to intermittence, and 
streaming can be easily interrupted or slowed. To counteract this 
and allow a person to view streamed content uninterrupted, the 
computer “buffers” the content. It gathers the data a few seconds 
ahead of time before it is shown on a screen; if the continuous 
stream should be interrupted, there will be a few seconds as back-
16 Dictionary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/streaming (last visited Feb. 7, 2014). 
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up to allow the computer a chance to catch up without having to 
interrupt the performance. The buffer data are not stored like 
downloaded data, but are temporarily accessible by a streaming 
program. 
The distinction between downloading and streaming is 
important in copyright law. Streaming implicates two statutory 
rights: the right of reproduction and the right of public 
performance.17 The former concerns the tangible copying of 
copyrighted works (such as bootlegged records or downloaded 
material), while the latter is concerned with the performance of 
copyrighted works.18 There has been much discussion about 
whether non-permissive streaming of copyrighted content violates 
one or both rights.19  
While there is no statutory definition of streaming in the 
Copyright Act, the Act includes language defining public 
performance and transmission of works. The Copyright Act’s 
definition a public performance contains what is known as the 
Transmit Clause, which describes when transmission of 
copyrighted content should be considered a public performance.20 
However, without further guidance from Congress or the Supreme 
Court, lower courts have had to construe the definition of a public 
performance as new technologies have challenged the boundaries 
of that definition. 
 
II. SETTING THE STAGE FOR AEREO 
 
In recent years, courts have considered the potential for 
infringement by streaming technology, paving the way for the 
Aereo decision. Much of the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Aereo 
was based on the Cablevision court’s analysis of the public 
performance and reproduction rights in the context of digital 
transmissions of copyrighted television content. The Cablevision 
decision, in turn, owed a debt to the earlier Third Circuit case 
17 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (5) (2012).  
18 See id. 
19 See, e.g., Mai Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th 
Cir. 1993). 
20 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  
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Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., in which the 
court considered content performance in the pre-Internet era. 
 
A.  Cablevision and the Reproduction Right 
 
In Cablevision, television content providers sued the 
eponymous defendant cable television company for offering its 
subscribers a remote-storage digital video recorder (RS-DVR) 
system in addition to its normal programming content.21 
Cablevision had a license to transmit television content to its 
subscribers, but did not have a license to offer the RS-DVR, which 
created a second transmission of the same content and allowed 
subscribers to copy television content for later playback. Like all 
cable companies, Cablevision gathered television content from 
various broadcasters and other content providers and transmitted it 
to subscribers, generally in real time.22 The transmission can be 
thought of as traveling along a single stream: content is transmitted 
from broadcasters to Cablevision, which in turn transmits it to 
subscribers. With its RS-DVR service, Cablevision bifurcated this 
stream.23 Unlike a stand-alone digital video recorder, the RS-DVR 
allowed subscribers to record television content on remote hard 
drives maintained by Cablevision.24 Content was transmitted to 
subscribers in real time, but a second transmission was sent to 
Cablevision’s drives. Cablevision had a license for the first stream, 
but not for the second stream. 
The plaintiffs sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, 
alleging direct infringement under three theories. First, they argued 
Cablevision was making unauthorized copies of their content by 
buffering their content for use in the RS-DVR. Second, the 
plaintiffs argued that Cablevision was also making unauthorized 
copies by allowing users to copy content onto Cablevision’s hard 
drives for later playback. Third, the plaintiffs argued that 
Cablevision was infringing their public performance right by 
allowing subscribers to play back these recordings on their 
21 Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 123. 
22 Id. at 124. 
23 Id. 
24 See id. at 125. 
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televisions. This last argument and the court’s analysis of the 
Transmit Clause was most relevant to the Aereo decision, but the 
central issue in Cablevision was copying. 
Ruling on the RS-DVR buffering argument, the court held the 
activity was not infringing the plaintiffs’ right of reproduction.25 
Section 101 of the Copyright Act requires that for a work to be 
considered to have been reproduced, or copied, it must be “fixed in 
a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment . . . is 
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be . . . reproduced  
. . . for a period of more than transitory duration.”26 The court 
interpreted the section as imposing two requirements for a work to 
have been “reproduced:” (1) it must be embodied in a medium (the 
embodiment requirement), and (2) it must remain embodied “for a 
period of more than transitory duration” (the duration 
requirement).27 
Whether an online buffer met these requirements proved 
complicated. The Cablevision court held that because a copy could 
potentially be extracted from the buffer, the buffer met the 
embodiment requirement.28 However, the court believed that the 
buffer did not meet the duration requirement: “No bit of data 
remains in any buffer for more than a fleeting 1.2 seconds . . . . 
[E]ach bit of data here is rapidly and automatically overwritten as 
soon as it is processed.”29 Thus, unauthorized buffering by itself, 
and by extension streaming, was not a violation of the copyright 
holder’s reproduction right. 
In addressing the plaintiffs’ second theory—whether 
Cablevision was liable for copying programs onto its hard drives 
via its subscribers’ RS-DVRs—the court was chiefly concerned 
with who made the copy. In order to be liable for direct 
infringement, the court required volitional conduct in copying.30 
The court held that because it was the subscriber who ordered the 
25 Id. at 130 
26 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 127. 
27 See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 8.02(B)(2) (rev. ed., 2013). 
28 Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 129. 
29 Id. at 130. 
30 Id. at 131.  
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system to produce the copy, the subscriber was the actor with 
volitional conduct, while Cablevision merely provided the 
hardware and capability.31 While the company might have been 
liable for contributory infringement, the plaintiffs did not make this 
argument, so the court felt no need to discuss the issue.32 
 
B.  Cablevision and the Public Performance Right 
 
The plaintiffs’ third and final argument—and the most 
important to the later result in Aereo—was that Cablevision’s RS-
DVR service violated the plaintiff’s public performance right by 
way of the Transmit Clause. Via the RS-DVR system, a 
Cablevision subscriber requests a program he has recorded, and 
Cablevision transmits the program from the company’s hard drives 
to the subscriber’s home.33 The plaintiffs argued these 
transmissions directly infringed their right of public performance, 
enumerated in Sections 106 and 101 of the Copyright Act.34 
Section 106(4) grants copyright holders the exclusive right, “in 
the case of . . . motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to 
perform the copyrighted work publicly.”35 Section 101 further 
defines what is meant by performing publicly: 
To perform or display a work “publicly” means—
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the 
public or at any place where a substantial number of 
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and 
its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to 
transmit or otherwise communicate a performance 
or display of the work to a place specified by clause 
. . . or to the public, by means of any device or 
process, whether the members of the public capable  
 
 
 
31 Id. at 132. 
32 Id. at 133. 
33 Id. at 125. 
34 Id.  
35 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012). 
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of receiving the performance or display receive it in 
the same place or in separate places and at the 
same time or at different times.36 
There are essentially three definitions in this section, and the 
second two make up what is known as the Transmit Clause. This 
clause allows for transmissions of works to be public performances 
within the meaning of the statute even if they are viewed in private 
places such as homes.37  
Cablevision’s RS-DVR transmits performances, so it fits 
within the second half of the Transmit Clause. The Cablevision 
court noted that “[n]o one disputes that the RS-DVR playback 
results in the transmission of a performance of a work––the 
transmission from [Cablevision’s hard drives] to the customer’s 
36 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added). 
37 See NIMMER, supra note 27, at § 8.14(C)(1). Professor Nimmer wrestled 
with how to limit the transmit clause, because it was at risk of reading out the 
term “public” completely. If a television broadcast is a public performance even 
when people are not physically assembled, then when can there be a private 
performance? To elaborate on this dilemma, it is important to understand the 
difference between the underlying copyrighted work and the many copies of that 
work that people watch on their televisions. If performances can be public when 
they are played in private hotels or even in private homes because that same 
underlying work was transmitted to “separate places and at the same time or at 
different times,” then it is hard to imagine when copyrighted works may be 
transmitted privately and without violating the Copyright Act. 
In order to work around this, Nimmer compromised and interpreted the 
Copyright Act in a way that limited this dilemma. He stated, “Upon reflection, it 
would seem that what must have been intended was that if the same copy (or 
phonorecord) of a given work is repeatedly played (i.e., ‘performed’) by 
different members of the public, albeit at different times, this constitutes a 
‘public’ performance.” Nimmer used an example of an old-fashioned peep show 
device, in which many people observed its performance but at different times. 
Limiting the transmit clause to single copies, while not found explicitly within 
the Copyright Act, did limit the elimination of private performances, because it 
separated the underlying work from individual performances by focusing on 
single copies. If a single copy was used by different people at different times, 
those performances could be considered public. But if a single copy was only 
used by a single person and watched many times, this would not be a public 
performance. This compromise was adopted into common law long before 
Cablevision followed it.  
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television set.”38 But the court held Cablevision’s transmissions 
via the RS-DVR were not public performances, stating that the 
opposite holding would “render the ‘to the public’ language 
surplusage.”39 The court felt that if it considered these RS-DVR 
transmissions public performances, it would “obviate[] any 
possibility of a purely private transmission.”40 
The court found support for its decision in the Third Circuit 
ruling in Redd Horne41 and the treatise Nimmer on Copyright, 
using what can be called the “single copy requirement.” The court 
held, 
[T]he use of a unique copy may limit the potential 
audience of a transmission and is therefore relevant 
to whether that transmission is made “to the 
public.” . . . Given that each RS–DVR transmission 
is made to a given subscriber using a copy made by 
that subscriber, we conclude that such a 
transmission is not “to the public,” without 
analyzing the contours of that phrase in great 
detail.42 
The Cablevision court felt that the single copy requirement 
may “limit the potential audience of a transmission . . . .”43 But a 
problem arises once making copies of performances becomes 
extremely cheap and distributing them to thousands of people 
38  Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 134. 
39 Id. at 135. 
40 Id. at 136. 
41 Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 
1984). 
42 Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 138. Note the court’s first conclusion, that the 
use of a unique copy may limit the potential audience of a transmission. This 
was Nimmer’s great compromise: by limiting the potential audience to those 
seeing a particular copy of a work, one could avoid the dilemma of defining a 
public performance under the transmit clause in too broad a sense. NIMMER, 
supra note 27, at § 8.14[C][3]. That is, if the transmit clause is interpreted to 
mean the potential audience of the underlying work, and thus essentially the 
entire public (because anyone can conceivably gain access to work such as a 
freely available television broadcast), the "public" part of a public performance 
becomes essentially meaningless.  
43 Id. 
                                                                                                             
11
Méndez: <i>Aereo</i> and <i>Cablevision</i>: How Courts Are Struggling to
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2014
250 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL. 9:3 
individually becomes technically feasible and profitable. This is 
essentially what Aereo did. The Cablevision court’s focus on 
whether a performance stems from a unique copy is what allowed 
for the distorted outcome of Aereo, permitting a company to take 
copyrighted content and distribute it to its subscribers on a mass 
scale without compensating the copyright holders. Although the 
single copy requirement, which arose out of the Redd Horne 
decision and a discussion in the Nimmer treatise, made sense at the 
time given the technological restrictions and cost of making copies, 
it is much harder to justify in today’s technological landscape. 
 
C.  Redd Horne and the Single Copy Requirement 
 
Entertainment content companies’ inability to evolve is not 
unprecedented. Other emerging technologies have, in the past, 
upended established business models. Redd Horne concerned one 
such upending. A videotape shop, Maxwell’s, rented tapes (all 
legitimately purchased) to customers and provided them with 
private screening rooms in the shop where they could watch their 
rentals.44 Each room could accommodate no more than four 
people, and the tapes were played from a central bank of videotape 
machines (VCRs) behind a counter, operated by Maxwell’s 
employees.45 A selected movie would be transmitted from one 
VCR to a television in one of the private rooms.46 A number of 
motion picture companies sued, arguing Maxwell’s was infringing 
on their public performance right under the Copyright Act.47 
The court determined that viewing these tapes constituted a 
performance and proceeded to analyze whether these performances 
were public under the Transmit Clause.48 The court held these 
performances to be public, finding no functional difference 
between Maxwell’s services and those offered by movie theaters.49 
The court held that the relevant “place” within the meaning of the 
44 Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 157. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 158. 
49 Id. at 160. 
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§ 101 definition was each of Maxwell’s two stores, not each 
individual booth within each store. “Simply because the cassettes 
can be viewed in private does not mitigate the essential fact that 
Maxwell’s is unquestionably open to the public.”50  
The Redd Horne court’s discussion of the relevant place is 
particularly interesting in light of the Cablevision decision. The 
Cablevision court focused on each particular performance viewed 
by a subscriber.51 But Redd Horne should have guided the court to 
focus on whether any member of the public could pay a fee to view 
a performance. The court could have viewed the relevant place of 
performance to have been the entire Cablevision “store,” or 
focused on the company’s service as a whole rather than each 
individual performance. Instead, its analysis was better suited to 
the individual booths in Maxwell’s, which were not open to the 
public.  
But the use of individual copies was at least as important as the 
place of performance. In his famed treatise, Professor Nimmer 
presciently posed a hypothetical concerning “theaters in which 
patrons occupy separate screening rooms.”52 Nimmer rightly stated 
that it would be absurd to expect every consumer to obtain a public 
performance license to play their legitimately purchased records, 
simply because the same copyrighted work had been played at 
another time.53 In order to deal with this potential audience 
problem under the Transmit Clause, Nimmer found a creative 
solution that was an effective limitation to this problem—one that 
worked in a pre-Internet era. Nimmer stated, “what must have been 
intended was that if the same copy (or phonorecord) of a given 
work is repeatedly played (i.e., ‘performed’) by different members 
of the public, albeit at different times, this constitutes a ‘public’ 
performance.”54 Finding public performances through the repeated 
use of a single copy by different members of the public creates 
legal room for private performances without having to excise the 
Transmit Clause’s language on performances that are 
50 Id. at 159. 
51 Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 135.  
52 NIMMER, supra note 27, at § 8.14(C)(3). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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chronologically dispersed. Redd Horne adopted this rationale and 
found Maxwell’s to be infringing because it played the same 
copies of movies repeatedly for different customers.55  
The problem with the single copy requirement as an answer to 
public performances under the Transmit Clause is that it diverts the 
focus away from the composition of the audience and onto copies 
of the work, and its reasoning (while sensible for the time) cannot 
be found in the statute or in legislative reports. While the court in 
Cablevision agreed with and continued to use the single copy 
requirement, it admitted that “neither the Redd Horne court nor 
Prof. Nimmer explicitly explains why the use of a distinct copy 
affects the Transmit Clause inquiry.”56 The impracticalities of 
duplicate copies vanish when technology advances to a point 
where one could easily generate new copies at low or no cost, such 
as when Cablevision generates a new stream with its RS-DVR for 
each performance of a work requested by a subscriber, or when 
Aereo captures broadcasted content and transmits it to a subscriber 
from a single antenna. 
 
III. AEREO  
 
In WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., Aereo successfully 
contended that it was providing a “technology platform that 
enables consumers to use remotely-located equipment . . . to 
create, access and view their own unique recorded copies of free 
over-the-air broadcast television programming.”57 Essentially, 
Aereo argued that its transmissions were private performances.58 
Aereo’s act of assigning an individual antenna to each subscriber 
55 Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 159. This was not so explicitly stated in the 
Third Circuit decision, but was explained more thoroughly in the district court 
decision. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne Inc., 568 F. Supp. 494, 
501 (1983) (“The two Maxwell’s facilities each have only one copy of a given 
film title and, therefore, must perform the same copy of a given work repeatedly. 
We find that Congress intended that this portion of the definition also serve as 
protection for copyright owners from infringing performances such as those 
accomplished by Maxwell’s showcasing.”). 
56 Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 138.  
57 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 696, 696–97 (2d Cir. 2013). 
58 Id. 
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was key to the court’s belief that the individual streams created 
unique copies of content for that user and were private 
performances, thus satisfying the single copy requirement that 
arose out of Nimmer’s treatise and Redd Horne and was adopted in 
Cablevision.59 
Aereo did not shed new light upon the public performance right 
so much as it expanded upon the conclusion in Cablevision. In 
finding that Aereo and its subscribers were engaging in private 
performances just like the parties in Cablevision, the court found 
both companies’ systems shared two essential characteristics: they 
created a unique copy for each user and transmitted that to the 
associated user.60 Because of these characteristics, the court found 
these transmissions to be private performances.  
Though unsuccessful, two of the plaintiffs’ arguments in Aereo 
are worth noting. First, they argued that because Cablevision had a 
license to transmit content in the first place, the question in that 
case was whether the defendants needed a second license in order 
to operate the RS-DVR service.61 The plaintiffs argued it was 
pertinent Aereo had no license to transmit in the first place.62 The 
court rejected this argument, finding the issue of whether Aereo 
had a license irrelevant because the main question was whether 
Aereo’s transmissions were public performances.63 According to 
the court, “whether Aereo has a license is not relevant to whether 
its transmissions are public and therefore must be licensed.”64 The 
court also drew support from Cablevision by pointing out the court 
in that case was also not concerned with licensing.65  
Judge Chin, dissenting, found the licensing distinction 
significant:  
Aereo is doing precisely what cable companies, 
satellite television companies, and authorized 
Internet streaming companies do—they capture 
59 Id. at 696. 
60 Id. at 689–90. 
61 Id. at 690. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
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over-the-air broadcasts and retransmit them to 
customers—except that those entities are doing it 
legally, pursuant to statutory or negotiated licenses, 
for a fee. By accepting Aereo’s argument that it 
may do so without authorization and without paying 
a fee, the majority elevates form over substance.66 
This “form over substance” point is instructive. Both 
Cablevision and Aereo include detailed explanations of the 
technology platforms, and the outcomes of the cases were largely 
based on how the technology was set up—what Judge Chin in 
referred to as the “form.” Judge Chin argued the focus should be 
on the “substance,” which was whether Aereo’s system fit the 
plain meaning of public transmission. 
The plaintiffs’ other notable argument was that Aereo’s system 
was functionally very different from Cablevision’s. As the court 
described it, the plaintiffs analogized Cablevision’s RS-DVR 
system to a typical VCR, while Aereo’s system was more similar 
to a cable television provider.67 The court responded to this 
argument by acknowledging that while “the Cablevision court did 
compare the RS–DVR system to the stand-alone VCR, these 
comparisons occur in the section of that opinion discussing 
Cablevision’s potential liability for infringing the plaintiffs’ 
reproduction right.”68 Thus, “[n]o part of Cablevision’s analysis of 
the public performance right appears to have been influenced by 
any analogy to the stand-alone VCR.”69  
It appears the court, much like with the licensing issue, did not 
deny the logic of the plaintiffs’ argument but instead considered it 
irrelevant. The court curiously dismissed the argument by simply 
pointing out that the VCR analogy in Cablevision was drawn in the 
section of that opinion dealing with the reproduction right, rather 
than the public performance right.70 Context matters, but given 
Cablevision’s application of the single copy requirement, which 
deals with the public performance right but it also concerned with 
66 Id. at 697. 
67 Id. at 691. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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reproduction, it seems strange to cordon these two rights off from 
each other. 
In his dissent, Judge Chin felt the issue of Aereo’s primary 
function was instructive. He argued that a service’s design and use 
is important to the analysis of infringement.71 Judge Chin 
distinguished the two services and stated, “Cablevision’s RS–DVR 
system ‘exist[ed] only to produce a copy’ of material that it already 
had a license to retransmit to its subscribers, but the Aereo system 
produces copies to enable it to transmit material to its 
subscribers.”72 Judge Chin argued that the functionality and 
primary purpose of these services can provide guidance as to 
whether they infringe or not:  
Aereo’s use of copies is essential to its ability to 
retransmit broadcast television signals, while 
Cablevision’s copies were merely an optional 
alternative to a set-top DVR. The core of Aereo’s 
business is streaming broadcasts over the Internet in 
real-time; the addition of the record function, 
however, cannot legitimize the unauthorized 
retransmission of copyrighted content.73 
This argument is related to the licensing argument. Cablevision 
was not offering any new service for receiving content because it 
already provided cable television service. It had a license to 
provide this core service, one that subscribers paid for. The issue in 
Cablevision was the secondary transmission via the RS-DVR, 
which copied programs to be watched later and the primary 
function of which was copying already authorized transmissions, 
not the transmitted material in the first place. Thus Cablevision 
was about the reproduction right and not the public performance 
right.  
But the latter was more important in Aereo. Aereo’s primary 
function is live streaming, and this primary transmission (unlike 
the secondary one in Cablevision) was the one that caused the 
dispute. Aereo’s service can be used record programs as well, as 
71 Id. at 703. 
72 Id. at 702 (citations omitted). 
73 Id. 
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Judge Chin noted,74 but that should not divert the focus over its 
primary transmission and whether or not that transmission was 
authorized. 
These arguments might have prevailed, and Aereo might have 
been liable for infringement, if not for the Cablevision precedent. 
The court invoked stare decisis, explaining that, “though presented 
as efforts to distinguish Cablevision, many of Plaintiffs’ arguments 
really urge us to overrule Cablevision.”75 This the Second Circuit 
was unwilling to do. However, other courts that have considered 
the issues have declined to adopt the Cablevision rule. 
 
IV. DIFFERING VIEWPOINTS IN OTHER CIRCUITS 
 
While Aereo is currently the only circuit-level case on 
unlicensed single-copy Internet broadcasting, some district courts 
have considered similar issues. Firstly, Aereo was sued in the 
Massachusetts District Court soon after it expanded into Boston, 
and the court there recently denied a motion for a preliminary 
injunction against Aereo.76 Another company has had far less 
judicial success than Aereo. The company, known variously as 
BarryDriller, Aereokiller, FilmOn, and FilmOn X (henceforth 
referred to in this Article by the latter name), also retransmits 
broadcast television over the Internet to paying subscribers without 
paying the owners of the broadcasted copyrighted content.77 Just 
like Aereo, FilmOn X utilizes large banks of small antennas in an 
attempt to get around the single copy requirement.78  
The District Court for the Central District of California held in 
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Systems, PLC 
that FilmOn X was infringing the plaintiffs’ public performance 
right.79 Further, in Fox Television Stations Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC 
74 Id. at 702 
75 Id. at 695. 
76 Hearst Stations, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13–11649–NMG, 2013 WL 
5604284, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 8, 2013). 
77 Andrew Laughlin, FilmOn to disrupt TV with new streaming channels, 
DIGITAL SPY (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.digitalspy.com/media/news/a458001/ 
filmon-to-disrupt-tv-with-new-streaming-channels.html 
78 Id.  
79 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Systems, PLC, 915 
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the District Court for the District of Columbia granted a 
preliminary injunction against FilmOnX, concluding that “the 
Copyright Act forbids FilmOn X from retransmitting Plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted programs over the Internet,” and the plaintiffs were 
“thus likely to succeed on their claim that FilmOn X violates 
[their] exclusive public performance rights in their copyrighted 
works.”80 FilmOn X appealed both of these cases, but the appeals 
have been stayed pending the Supreme Court decision.81 
 
A.  Fox Television Stations v. BarryDriller 
 
In BarryDriller, FilmOn X argued their service was 
technologically analogous to Aereo’s and thus legal under Aereo.82 
The plaintiffs sued for the same reasons as in Aereo, arguing that 
FilmOn X was infringing their right of public performance under 
the Transmit Clause.83 The court held for the plaintiffs, who have 
appealed.84 The BarryDriller court brought up Cablevision early in 
its analysis, mentioning that court’s reliance on the single copy 
requirement and its focus on a particular performance of a work 
rather than the underlying work to find that Cablevision and its 
subscribers were engaging in private performances.85 But the 
BarryDriller court took a different approach, and held the 
Copyright Act in Section 101 states a performance is public when 
the underlying copyrighted work is performed publicly, not a 
particular performance of the copyrighted work.86 According to 
BarryDriller, “The definition section sets forth what constitutes a 
public performance of a copyrighted work, and says that 
F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
80 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X, LLC, No. 13-758 (RMC), 
Case 1:13-cv-00758-RMC, at *1 (D. D.C. Sept. 5, 2013). 
81  Kurt Orzeck, 9th Circ. Halts FilmOn Case Until Justices Rule On Aereo, 
LAW360, (Jan. 29, 2014, 6:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/505263/ 
9th-circ-halts-filmon-case-until-justices-rule-on-aereo. 
82 BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1140–41. 
83  Id. at 1143. 
84 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, NBCUniversal Media, LLC v. Aereokiller, 
LLC; 2013 WL 1888669 (9th Cir. 2013). 
85 BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1143. 
86 Id. 1144. 
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transmitting a performance to the public is a public performance. It 
does not require a ‘performance’ of a performance.”87 While this 
may sound confusing, this is tackling the same problem addressed 
in Cablevision. That is, when analyzing whether a performance 
was public, does one look at the particular performance in 
question, or the underlying work that was performed? The 
BarryDriller court held, in contrast to the rationale in Cablevision 
and Aereo, that focusing on the underlying work was the relevant 
approach.88 
The BarryDriller court held the focus should not be on a 
particular transmission and should instead be on the underlying 
copyrighted work.89 The court refuted Cablevision’s embrace of 
the single copy requirement by holding there was no such 
requirement in the Copyright Act or in the legislative history.90 
The court went on: 
Very few people gather around their oscilloscopes 
to admire the sinusoidal waves of a television 
broadcast transmission. People are interested in 
watching the performance of the work. And it is the 
public performance of the copyrighted work with 
which the Copyright Act, by its express language, is 
concerned. Thus, Cablevision’s focus on the 
uniqueness of the individual copy from which a 
transmission is made is not commanded by the 
statute.91 
It seems BarryDriller equated a transmission to “the sinusoidal 
waves of a television broadcast transmission” on an oscilloscope, 
and was not by itself a performance. Cablevision may not have 
been mistaken by stating transmissions could be performances 
themselves, even if its ruling as a whole was misguided. But this 
difference may be beside the point, because either way the 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1144–45 (“Precedent in the Ninth Circuit instead properly looks at 
public performance of the copyrighted work.”). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1144. 
91 Id. at 1144–45. 
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question is whether, under the Transmit Clause, we consider the 
audience of a particular transmission or the underlying work. 
BarryDriller held a performance should be understood as the 
content people watch, and that the single copy requirement was not 
in the statute. 
Notably, the BarryDriller court looked to the physical distance 
a transmission has to travel from the antenna to the receiving 
device, a distinction found nowhere in Cablevision or Aereo: 
Defendants . . . analogized their service to self-
contained portable televisions of the kind that have 
been available for many years which can be used, 
e.g., by attendees at a football game to watch 
another game being played at the same time. That 
argument ignores a key distinction. In marked 
contrast to Defendants’ system here, such portable 
televisions play the broadcast signal within inches 
of the place the signal is received by the attached 
antenna, and do not ‘send[ ] out some sort of signal 
via a device or process to be received by the public 
at a place beyond the place from which it is sent.’92  
Under this reasoning, performances are private when the 
source of the transmission is very close to the person viewing the 
performance. In Cablevision, the court discussed the hypothetical 
“hapless customer who records a program in his den and later 
transmits the recording to a television in his bedroom [who] would 
be liable for publicly performing the work simply because some 
other party had once transmitted the same underlying performance 
to the public.”93 Under BarryDriller, this customer could escape 
liability because the distance between the recording device in his 
den and the television in his bedroom is a matter of feet and not 
miles, as in the cases of Cablevision and Aereo. This physical 
proximity could offer a limiting factor to Transmit Clause analysis 
in the spirit of the single copy requirement, but without the same 
distorting effects.  
Also pertinent in the hapless customer example is the 
92 Id. at 1146 (citation omitted). 
93 Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 136. 
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noncommercial nature of the transmission from den to bedroom. 
Commerciality was relevant in BarryDriller, as the court 
distinguished between a single person making copies for himself 
and a commercial provider who provides this service for its 
subscribers.94 Commerciality by itself would probably not be 
sufficient to find a performance public, but it can still lend 
persuasive weight. 
 
B.  Fox Television Stations v. FilmOn X 
 
FilmOn X concerned the same company as BarryDriller, and 
the facts were nearly identical save for the location, which this 
time was Washington, D.C. As in BarryDriller, the FilmOn X 
court rejected the Aereo analysis and granted the plaintiffs’ motion 
for a temporary injunction.95 The court held the Transmit Clause 
should be interpreted broadly to include technologies Congress 
may not have anticipated, such as the one offered by FilmOn X.96  
The court also disputed whether FilmOn X’s technology 
platform actually facilitated a one-to-one relationship between a 
single mini-antenna and a subscriber. The court explained:  
[T]his is a charitable description of FilmOn X’s 
arrangement; while each user may have an assigned 
antenna and hard-drive directory temporarily, the 
mini-antennas are networked together so that a 
single tuner server and router, video encoder, and 
distribution endpoint can communicate with them 
all. The television signal is captured by FilmOn X 
and passes through FilmOn X’s single electronic 
transmission process of aggregating servers and 
electronic equipment. This system, through which  
 
 
 
94 BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1146. 
95 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, No. 13-758 RMC, 2013 
WL 4763414, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2013), reconsideration denied, No. 13-758 
RMC, 2013 WL 4852300 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2013).  
96 Id. at *13. 
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any member of the public who clicks on the link for 
the video feed, is hardly akin to an individual user 
stringing up a television antenna on the roof.97 
This line of reasoning, not found in Aereo, points out that 
whether equipment is shared among users is relevant if a court is 
going to focus on specific technology, as the Aereo court did.  
However, it seems dubious whether courts should really offer 
much weight to the specific technology of a company; the focus on 
technology in Cablevision is what gave Aereo the ability to operate 
and exploit a loophole. Focusing on technology in courts breeds 
loopholes, because technology can develop much faster than court 
reasoning can. This is not to say that how technology operates is 
irrelevant to a court’s analysis. Technology matters. It just should 
not dictate how a court will rule. More important than the 
technology itself is how the technology affects the law and the 
marketplace. That said, if courts are going to focus on specific 
technicalities, FilmOn X makes a valid point to not focus purely on 
the mini-antennae and look at other facets of the company’s 
technology. 
In this vein, the FilmOn X court pointed to the commercial 
nature of the defendant and held that there were no meaningful 
differences from cable companies, which were required to obtain 
licenses to retransmit broadcasted content.98 The court stated the 
relationship cable companies had with broadcasters was the 
primary motivation for the enactment of the Copyright Act in 
1976.99 The court noted: 
It speaks volumes that Congress settled on a 
compulsory licensing regime for cable companies 
that wish to carry over-the-air broadcasts. Whether 
FilmOn X should be subject to a similar licensing 
regime is not before the Court. It suffices to say that 
nothing about the 1976 Act or its legislative history 
suggests that Congress intended a commercial entity 
that rebroadcasts copyright material for  
97 Id. at *14. 
98 Id.  
99 Id.  
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consumption by the public, such as FilmOn X, to 
avoid liability for infringement of the copyright 
holders’ exclusive right to public performance.100 
The court here drew a parallel between FilmOn X’s technology 
platform and that of cable companies, and found no meaningful 
difference under the Transmit Clause. This was in stark contrast to 
Aereo, which found great importance in how the defendants’ 
technology operated. The FilmOn X court chose not to focus on 
technicalities, deciding instead to focus on the actual effect the 
defendants had on the marketplace and its potential to change 
judicial copyright analysis should they be held not liable. 
Suffice it to say that there is disagreement among the federal 
courts at this point. Now that the Supreme Court has agreed to 
weigh in on the issues, we can hope for more clarity. 
 
V. LOOKING FORWARD: LEGISLATIVE ACTION AND THE 
FUTURE OF TELEVISION 
 
Where does this leave us? The litigation is still ongoing as 
Aereo expands across the country, so one can only guess as to how 
the Supreme Court will rule. Aereo shows a map on its blog of the 
numerous cities to which it plans to expand; unsurprisingly, all are 
outside of the Ninth Circuit.101 Much of Aereo’s business strategy 
has been built around its litigation success, and its future looks 
bright unless the Supreme Court decides differently. 
Whatever the outcome at the Court, the time appears ripe for 
Congress to act, should it find the political will. Representative 
Bob Goodlatte, Chairman of the Committee of the Judiciary in the 
U.S. House of Representatives, recently announced a 
comprehensive review of copyright law.102 Representative 
100 Id.  
101 Where Can I Get Aereo?, AEREO, https://aereo.com/coverage (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2014). 
102 Casey Rae, House Judiciary to Examine US Copyright Law, FUTURE 
OF MUSIC COALITION (Apr. 25, 2013, 11:33 AM), 
https://futureofmusic.org/blog/2013/04/25/house-judiciary-examine-us-
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Goodlatte noted that “[f]ederal judges are forced to make decisions 
using laws that are difficult to apply today,” and that “[e]ven the 
Copyright Office itself faces challenges in meeting the growing 
needs of its customers—the American public.”103  
Why can’t broadcasters be required to issue a license to 
companies like Aereo for their copyrighted material, allowing for 
both sides to profit? This would parallel the legal framework set up 
for cable companies, and it seems strange to treat companies like 
Aereo differently, even though they are not technically cable 
companies. However, such a regime is not without drawbacks. 
Section 111 of the Copyright Act addresses secondary 
transmissions by cable providers.104 This section sets up a 
compulsory licensing regime that requires television broadcasters 
to license copyrighted material to cable providers. Companies have 
argued that § 111 of the Copyright Act should be construed 
broadly to include online streaming service providers like Aereo, 
requiring broadcasters to provide a compulsory license for their 
material,105 but this argument has not yet proved successful.106  
The ambiguity of the statutory language is problematic. As one 
court stated, “[b]ased on the statutory text alone, it is simply not 
clear whether a service that retransmits television programming 
live and over the Internet constitutes a cable system under § 
111.”107 However, in finding that § 111 did not apply to Internet 
copyright-law. 
103 Id. 
104 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012).  
105 WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 279 (2d Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 1585, 185 L. Ed. 2d 607 (2013). 
106 Id. at 284. 
107 Id. at 280. In the dicta of the case, the court interestingly brought up the 
legal issues in the 1990s with regards to the Copyright Act and satellite 
television broadcasts. In 1991, Congress codified in § 119 a separate 
compulsory license for satellite carriers, and in 1994 Congress amended § 111 to 
expressly include “microwave” as an acceptable communications channel for 
retransmissions. Regarding the Internet, the court noted, “Congress did not, 
however, intend for § 111’s compulsory license to extend to Internet 
transmissions. Indeed, the legislative history indicates that if Congress had 
intended to extend § 111’s compulsory license to Internet retransmissions, it 
would have done so expressly—either through the language of § 111 as it did for 
microwave retransmissions . . . .” Id. at 281–82. 
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retransmission, the court leaned on the Copyright Office’s position 
that such services “are not cable systems and do not qualify for § 
111 compulsory licenses.”108  
The Copyright Office has expressed concern that compulsory 
licensing for retransmissions “would effectively wrest control 
away from program producers . . . and would likely undercut 
private negotiations, leaving content owners with relatively little 
bargaining power in the distribution of broadcast programming.”109 
But the Aereo court has effectively subverted the Copyright 
Office’s concern by functionally gutting the public performance 
rights of broadcasters. Companies like Aereo may well not be 
subject to § 111 licensing, but the views of the FilmOn X court, 
which issued a national injunction against FilmOn X, show that 
some courts may still find no meaningful difference between these 
new companies and cable companies. If the Copyright Office’s 
position has merit, perhaps Congress should look to removing the 
existing compulsory licensing regime for cable companies. The 
cable industry is certainly far better established than it was in 1976, 
and removing these outlays would allow for more equal bargaining 
positions among television providers. 
Whether the protection of copyrighted content is to come from 
Congress or the courts, Aereo leaves open the possibility that many 
content creators large and small may lose their right of public 
performance once their content is placed on the Internet. It is 
plausible to imagine Aereo’s one-to-one relationship between 
subscribers and mini-antennae expanded to other media besides 
broadcast television. Music, movies or any other media could be 
transmitted by companies that hold large arrays of transmitters 
where a single one sends information to a single user and the 
company avoids copyright liability. The concern is not just with 
public performances and the broadcast industry, but our entire 
conception of copyright protection with regards to the Internet. 
In this new environment, will the traditional television soon be 
obsolete? It seems the primary thing holding back a complete 
transformation into Internet-delivered television is the speed at 
108 Id. at 283. 
109 Id. 
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which people can access the Internet. But that too is changing 
rapidly. People will no longer be held back from streaming 
television and movies online, and distribution models like Aereo 
will present an even greater threat to established businesses. People 
today are simply no longer consuming content like they did in the 
1950s, where tens of millions of Americans crowded around 
television sets nationwide to watch a program. Broadcasters—and 
possibly copyright law—will have to adapt to these new 
surroundings or they risk going the way of the VCR and rotary 
telephone—obsolescence. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Article can only conclude so much, because litigation over 
the Aereo model continues. Broadcasters face falling revenues as 
the television market diversifies and splinters due to the continuing 
development of Internet-based distribution. The New York Times 
has reported that ratings among the Big Four broadcasters 
“together are dropping more precipitously than ever . . . . 
Advertisers are moving more cash to cable, cutting into the 
networks’ quarterly profits. New technologies are making it easier 
to skip those ads, anyway.”110 What is clear is that the market is 
changing. This Article does not advocate for one industry or 
company over another, but instead attempts to show how courts 
have struggled to harmonize the rapidly developing Internet with 
existing copyright law. The Copyright Act is still relevant, even in 
the age of the Internet, but it will require some reinterpretation 
with regards to public performances. 
Are broadcasters merely grappling with another tough 
competitor, or are they actually facing an existential threat? If 
Aereo stands, there seems little stopping other companies from 
cannibalizing the profits of the broadcasting industry. The Aereo 
and Cablevision courts held that the defendants were not infringing 
because their technological models were set up in such a way as to 
110 Brian Stelter, As TV Ratings and Profits Fall, Networks Face a 
Cliffhanger, N.Y. TIMES (May. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/ 
business/media/tv-networks-face-falling-ratings-and-new-rivals.html. 
 
                                                                                                             
27
Méndez: <i>Aereo</i> and <i>Cablevision</i>: How Courts Are Struggling to
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2014
266 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL. 9:3 
create a supposed “purely private transmission,”111 even though 
these models were for-profit and based on distributing content to a 
potentially wide swath of the general public. Other companies in 
other industries may well follow this reasoning and further 
circumvent broadcasters’ profit avenues. As the law stands now, 
there is little stopping cable and satellite companies from setting up 
“purely private transmissions” of their own and circumventing any 
compensation to the broadcast industry. This could also expand to 
other forms of media, such as music or movies, though courts have 
treated them differently. Courts need not protect industries out of 
some sense of nostalgia. Businesses and industries evolve as 
technology develops. Such is the nature of capitalism. But when it 
comes to copyright law, courts should focus more on how a party 
affects a market overall, and not on how its technological minutiae 
may be used to exploit perceived loopholes in copyright law. If our 
country is to preserve its historic protections of public performance 
rights, digital retransmission of broadcast television content should 
be considered a public performance if it reaches a wide audience, 
whether or not tiny antennae are used in the process. 
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 Whether a commercial entity sends or receives a 
transmission can indicate that the transmission is a public 
performance, but this should be considered only alongside 
other factors. 
 Physical proximity between the source of a transmission 
and the location at which it is viewed may be another factor 
in finding whether a performance is public, though this has 
not been adopted above the district court level. 
 When examining whether a public performance right has 
been violated, courts may focus either on a specific copy of 
a performance (the single copy requirement) or the 
performance’s underlying work. Stay tuned for the 
forthcoming Supreme Court decision. 
111 Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 136 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
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